But it’s useful to sit back and consider the element of contract here. When we borrow we commit to a contract that is so ancient so as to be part of our very soul. From Faustus to Scrooge, the spiritual nature of this bargain is ever present. I must mention here the fabulous work by Margaret Attwood titled “Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth“. It reminds me somewhat of Arundhati Roy’s venture into non-fiction in “The Cost of Living“. I like brilliant writers who veer off into interesting worldly issues and Attwood’s book has certainly inspired this post and much thought on the nature of debt itself.

It’s not the type of book I would expect from an author of fiction but it’s really a masterpiece on the understanding of debt and our long relationship with it. When we look at debt and debt slavery we realise it has been around since the beginning of time. The ability to hock one’s wife and child into servitude is not a recent phenomenon. The Faustian bargain is long known even if these days it’s for a consumer good (take your pick) on a 5 year no interest deal: no interest? do people actually believe that? Yes they do.

The focus is always on the weekly amount…..’oh that’s $15 a week. yes i can fit that into my budget”….shame it’s $15 a week forever!! and that television or sofa has cost you double, treble of even more than the advertised price…..oh and it’s worth sod all to sell.

Anyone remember Polonius? The father of Ophelia and general rambling windbag in the Kingdom of Denmark (That’s Hamlet for you who didn’t have the joys of Shakespeare at school).

“Neither a borrower nor a lender be”.

Famous words reprised many years later by Keynes at Bretton Woods when he proposed that countries should keep their trade accounts balanced as much as possible…..that applied to those in credit as well a debit.

And look where we are now……we’re at Payback time. But where is Mephistopheles? Who is going to do the collecting? To pay or not to pay? That is the question said Hamlet…perhaps.

The imbalances in the system are so great that there is no amount of money available to repay the debts. Perhaps they should all be written off as a bad idea and we should start again from scratch….but hark I hear Shylock coming…is there a pound of flesh available? Land…not transportable…but commodities from the land…maybe.

At some point the contract must be addressed; At some point a bargain must be made; At some point there will be the mother of all restructuring. Who will pay…now that really is the question.

I’ve just finished Michael Lewis’s “The Big Short”. It’s an amazing book, not just because it informs us of the road to the subprime mess but he creates a story around the protagonists. He also manages to expose the whole wretched mess, the fictionalisation of risk and yield laid bare. He introduces us to the main players in the debacle through the eyes of a few weird and wonderful players who worked out that something was terribly wrong and bet against it. These colourful characters expose the whole damn scheme as nothing more than a paper pyramid.

As Lewis sums up the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) on page 73:

“The CDO was, in effect, a credit laundering service for the residents of Lower Middle Class America. For Wall Street it was a machine that turned lead into gold”.

Simply put a CDO was a collection (a tower) of subprime loans that had miraculously transformed from junk status to triple A (AAA) credit and therefore it was investible by major funds (referred to in the book as dopey Germans).

So what was the short? Well on one hand you had investors who sold insurance on these debts defaulting. They believed (incorrectly) that it could never happen and therefore they were picking up free money. The shorters realised the were getting amazing odds on the loans defaulting and piled in.

At the bottom of this was an average person with no money and a big mortgage, usually 100% or more. Any fall in the price of their property would immediately put them in a default position. Yes it was a giant pyramid scheme. The real laugh is that even the guys going short didn’t really understand what it was they were shorting so opaque was the structure and process.

I recommend the book very highly. It’s a gripping read and manageable for the layperson.

You’re left wondering how the bankers got away with it. The answer given by the bankers (well laid out in Sorkin’s book) was that they were too big to fail.

This sets us up nicely for the next round.

P.S.

Today the SEC is launching a case against ICP Asset management for their role in handling CDO investments. Along with the case against Goldman Sachs we can expect more companies to be investigated for their role in this financial fraud. It will also be interesting to see when the rating agencies themselves will come under review. They were the ones who gave the AAA blessing to these products they really knew very little about. Makes you wonder about the whole darn shooting match!

Simply put this is how you can buy a house with no deposit or a small one. Consider the reality of leverage:

You buy a house for $500,000 and put down a 10% deposit of $50,000.

In a few years (certainly recent times) you sell it for $600,000. You have just made $100,000 from an investment of $50,000…a 200% return. Of course you have to subtract your interest but that is what you would have paid in rent anyway or so the theory goes.

In recent years this has been the name of the game. Between 2000 and 2008 New Zealand house prices rose 169%……..!! Yes that’s an incredible number………21% per annum on average. No wonder people thought this was an easy game. No wonder leveraged investments in property became the biggest game in town. But hold on: we are talking about houses not tulips. How could such an unusual bout of asset inflation happen right under the noses of the inflation focused RBNZ.

Well house prices are not included in the CPI calculation. Call me old fashioned but that’s ridiculous.

The major problem with any bubble is that it ends. In this case NZ has not had the same end as the USA with its sub-prime mortgage induced property collapse though the NZ finance company sector did its best to compete.

But the leverage has not been washed out of the system yet. House prices have recovered from the 2008-9 fall and now are back up close to their historic highs. Why is this? Why hasn’t the NZ housing market fallen back to more realistic levels?

There’s no clear answer but I’d like to suggest one: It’s not in the interest of the banks for prices to fall heavily. Why? Because they are the ultimate owners of the housing stock. If they lend 90% to a borrower and the price of that house falls 10% then the borrower has lost their equity and the bank owns the rest. That’s how leverage works on the downside. If the price falls further than 10% the borrower is into negative equity. So far so normal. The bank will just hoover up any savings or other assets held by the borrower. But at some point the bank is left holding the security. Banks don’t like that very much so they seek to sell the asset and recover as much cash as possible. If the borrower cannot cover the loss then the bank has to write that off.

But in a bubble situation the banks have to be very careful not to knock down the price of all property. Otherwise their entire lending portfolio will take a hit not just the one loan which went bad. So banks have a vested interest in keeping prices from falling too far.

Back in 2008 I called for land prices to fall 30%. They haven’t yet but it’s simply a matter of time. In fact they only fell 8.5%…not much of a fall considering the enormity of the rise. Wages are not rising at a rate which can cover the compounding interest on the debt pile (see upcoming post on debt) so the strains of maintaining the illusion will continue to show through. Therefore the banks have a big part to play in making sure house prices do not rise or fall too much whilst they reorganise their lending practices.

What needs to happen? Well a reversion to traditional lending practices will come back into vogue: where you can borrow 2-3 times your salary. Imagine that. Median wage in Christchurch is somewhere between $30-40,000 depending where you look and the average house price is $360,000. Scary……so the banks who are operating on the interest/cash flow model (see upcoming post on definancialisation) will find switching back to the traditional model simply isn’t possible as house prices would fall by rather a lot. You couldn’t find a house for under $200,000 these days so we would have to see a severe correction, probably in excess of 30% though very low borrowing costs would help ease that.

It’s clear that the same financial practices that we have seen employed in the global bond markets have also been applied to residential lending. The valuation model shifted from the established practice of ability to repay the mortgage to the ability to cover the interest. Why? Because the price of the house would always go up. Really? Isn’t delusion fun. The fact is that prices did go up….and up…and up. As they say the market can be wrong a lot longer than you can be right.

All this creates a major dilemma for banks (who are probably aware, one hopes, of their position) and regulators who clearly are not (always happy to be surprised): How to withdraw leverage (which was a ponzi scheme) from the residential mortgage market without causing a crash? How to realise that we have been deluding ourselves as to the  ”value” of our houses. How can we explain that 169% rise? Did we suddenly become more wealthy? Er no our trade balance for the period March 2000-2008 was minus $30.7bln!!!!

No we simply revalued our property again and again for no reason other than the banks were happy to go with the valuations (also pushed it has to be said by overseas immigrants paying cash prices) which just kept going up. If house A in one street sold for 20% more then all the other houses must be worth 20% more. Housing became a commodity and so was able to enjoy the commodity style price action……….of course housing isn’t a commodity as people actually live in them. And that is what is keeping the market afloat…..but don’t look too hard at the numbers. They might make you wonder exactly what it all means.

More on that in the upcoming posts on debt and definancialisation.

So the chickens have finally come home. And now the Euro project is in harms way. Or is this just the next stage in complete sovereign consilience? It’s fiscal consolidation or that’s the end of the road.

The real problem, if you look hard enough under the falling limbs of the EU forest, is simply debt and its modern bedfellow, leverage. The financial binge of the last decade, built upon market deregulation in the 80s, has simply finished. Apres le binge, le deluge as they might say in Paris. A bad hangover is one thing but watching bankers get on the big white telephone is no fun at all.

The debt binge primarily was brought about not so much by low interest rates (though that helped) but by the belief that capital gain was guaranteed. Stocks always go up in the long run, property always goes up in the long run…..don’t worry about income, just borrow as much as you can and buy an asset. These financial assets have become a magnet for all investors and, naturally, sellers of investment products. I wonder how many people are holding derivative products which allow them to catch the upside of the stock market with no risk unless the market falls 50%….oops. Certainly Mr Buffet has a few of those.

The return to a time when people invested in companies based on their fundamental performance and bought houses to live in is long overdue. That people cannot afford to buy a home is without doubt the result of excessive lending by banks over the last 30 years. This is the root cause of the problem. Banks have actually created the inflation we have seen in financial assets….unearned income to be exact. That asset price inflation has seen real wages fall heavily over the years consigning the average wage earner or those unable to access leveraged credit to a lifetime of renting and debt.

The maths of excessive leverage is the simple maths of compound interest….compounded.

As Paul Volcker noted in this recent piece,

“There was one great growth industry. Private debt relative to GDP nearly tripled in thirty years. Credit default swaps, invented little more than a decade ago, soared at their peak to a $60 trillion market, exceeding by a large multiple the amount of the underlying credits potentially hedged against default.”

The bottom line is very simple: we have spent our GDP already….for many years hence.

Now it’s payback time. The payback process could take many forms: bankruptcy, forced asset sales or a slow descent back to a normalized level of activity – actually living within our means. Stripping away the financial sector so it works for people and business rather than conspiring against them will be the first requirement: not so much regulation as reengineering.

Whichever route we take it will be a painful adjustment made worse by the fact that those who are in charge are actually responsible for perpetuating the current system or refusing to question and change it.

Now he is taking his personal brand of straight talking to the heart of America’s chronic food related problem, Huntington, West Virginia. This five county metropolitan area was designated as the unhealthiest city in the nation. Nearly half the adults in the area are obese with heart and diabetes problems running alongside.

It’s tough love all the way from the Essex Crusader who keeps giving us the harsh cold truth: crap in, crap out.

Maybe we need him down here in NZ….

The nineties seemed so easy in comparison…yes some financial disasters but they are part of the regular boom/busy cycle..but in general times were good and there was an air of stability. Y2K came and went and in all the excitement we had ourselves caught up in a huge stock market bubble…..the tech wreck….horribly followed by 9/11 and the start of a new era in US expansionary policy.

The last decade saw the financial system gutted from the inside out. That it is still standing is a testimony the the magic that one can weave with numbers. The spread of social media and the growth of the internet was nothing if astonishing. The ability to communicate 24/7 took many by surprise and for some completely took over their lives. The rise of Apple….and the iPod generation transformed music, computing and basically created a whole new industry in itself…mind you was it much different to the Walkman and its introduction? Yes Google, Apple, MySpace, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter brought the world of media, in all its forms, to a completely new level. But that’s what technology does…we’re just moving at an exponential rate.

China and the rest of the BRIC gang really came to the party. The US ended the decade on its knees…wrapped up in wars it cannot win, with a financial system in disarray and an economy on its knees. With Japan the first industrialized economy to fail and the US not far behind, the global shape of international relations has changed. Multi-polarity is an uncomfortable idea for many and how that works out will be a real test.

On that subject climate change continues to take center stage notwithstanding the inevitable failure of the Copenhagen talks. The records all show the noughties being the warmest on record but the small matter of fiddling numbers won’t have helped bolster the case of extreme action. When arguments hinge on tiny fractions any question on their veracity can have serious consequences. As a researcher in this area for sometime i must admit even i have become somewhat sanguine over the whole thing.

When I look back over the last decade and forward to the next, it seems as if the same themes will recur:

- Financialisation of Economies: Can we remove the yoke of derivative financial instruments from the real economy?

- Technology: Will social media enable the development of a networked based economy?

- Global Politics: Can we move to a multi-polar world without the necessity of the United Nations as a de facto world government?

- Climate change: How do we manage the change in our climate and the resulting shifts in population and its attendant baggage?

There’s plenty of hope in those questions for moving to a more sustainable world. But any one of those we get wrong could easily send us into a period of darkness. Let’s hope we don’t end up taking this road.

I will explore each topic in more detail over the next few weeks.

Recently smoke signals have been wafting from the Beehive as John Key and Kevin Rudd white flagged the issue in recent talks. When politicians say it’s a good idea but unlikely you know that it’s on the table. In fact this is not a new story. It comes up whenever there has been a proper meltdown and New Zealand looks a bit lonely and downbeat.

It’s been raised by some local economic commentators and all the usual pros and cons have been mentioned. Don Brash laid these all out nicely in a speech back in May 2000 and it’s hard to see past his conclusion that it is primarily a political decision, given that the economic pay off is unclear.

It may be a political decision then but it may not be a comfortable one. As Bernard Hickey writes today “we may not have a choice if we continue to borrow heavily”. The “shotgun wedding” wouldn’t be the most favourable outcome but NZ is not well placed at the moment. To coin a phrase you can’t be a little bit pregnant.

And, as Brian Gaynor writes, according to a recent OECD study, New Zealand is perilously close to Iceland in a ranking of countries with exposure to “overseas debt……personal debt and financial leverage”.The numbers are eye watering and the piper will be most surely paid at some point in time.

But, for now, the Australian banks, which make up most of our banking system, have underwritten us by sending new capital across the ditch. We also had to follow Australia’s deposit guarantee scheme with no choice in the matter. To all extents and purposes we are heavily dependent on them. So as Bernard notes we may find ourselves at the altar of currency union by default and not by political will. And it may happen sooner than we think.

Is there an alternative? Yes. A fully sovereign domestic money supply. More on that another time.

I guess we can call this Basel III or maybe a souped up Basel II. Who knows? When you have an inherently unstable system any new plan for control is likely to end up in the round filing cabinet before it has a chance to be implemented.

But one thing is clear from the latest global pow-wow: monetary stimulus will remain in place for some time as extra tightening through higher capital requirements sucks in more capital. With all the talk of recovering economies and poistive GDP reads in some countries, it is easy to forget the amount of wealth that has been sucked into the black hole of balance sheet never never land.

Who would be a bean counter these days?

It reminds me of the time I was working on the ticket sales operation for the Brisbane Expo back in 1988. It was a $60m take and I was drafted in to make the numbers balance. It was a lot of fun and eventually I got to the point where I had accounted for everything but there was still a pesky $110 I couldn’t reconcile. It simply didn’t make any sense to me but in the end I just gave up and figured it didn’t matter that much.

Now the numbers seem a bit larger when it comes to bank meltdowns. We have a long way to go before we actually can understand where the money has gone, who owes it, who lost it and what the actual impact on the supply of money is.

So in this case G20 are spot on. Deflationary forces abound. I have no worry about inflation at all. Sure we will keep seeing short term rebounds in some statistics and small sighs of relief. Let’s face it, the markets ahve had an enormous rally in the last 6 months. But do they reflect the underlying reality? Nope.

That’s because the crevasses have been papered over with huge swathes of new paper. But underneath they lie there waiting for some poor fool to fall in again. Slowly it feels like the bankers are starting to understand that they let credit growth go bananas and that their carefully constructed inflation numbers didn’t always tell the truth about asset prices.

We still have major systemic problems to deal with. Tightening credit will cause severe pain but low rates will help ease some of that. But catching the tiger by the tail is the only way forward.

So back then I suggested the RBNZ should think about selling as much NZ$ as they could. Why? Why go against prevailing market sentiment which is that intervention doesn’t really work and simply provides a target for the speculating hordes which incidentally account for 95% of the volume of daily trades.

That’s a fair sentiment when your currency is falling but when it’s rising? And when you have an eye popping foreign debt of almost 140% of GDP……that’s foreign debt not overall debt.

And yet the punters keep buying the NZ$. Perhaps they know something I don’t. Maybe 50 years worth of oil has been discovered in the Southern Basin. Who knows?

The point is that at some point that money has to be paid back and at the moment, due to the sneaky monster that is compound interest, we can’t even get close to reducing it.

But now is the time to strike.

Again I would like to suggest that the RBNZ starts selling NZ$. When you have a lot of something to sell it’s always best to do it when others are keen to buy. Now is that chance.

By selling NZ$ now and paying back, or at least holding for that same purpose, it will take the pressure off the very precarious dependency we have on overseas lenders.

This doesn’t eliminate the debt but simply transfers it to a domestic situation where it can be managed at lower rates and where there is no threat of having to suddenly repay.

How can the RBNZ do this? Again this is very simple. Print NZ$ and buy US$. There is no change to the actual money supply just how the debt is denominated.

Considering the implosion Iceland experienced and the unfolding disaster that is Ireland (surviving only due to its membership of the Euro), it makes complete sense just to get on with this now.

To allow foreign debt to be run at such a level is financial mismanagement of the highest level.

It also shows a willingness to be dictated to and dependent on overseas interests. This makes no sense at all when the country’s economy security is at stake.