Submissions on the new Mixed Ownership Model Bill (who dreamt that nonsense up?) closed last Friday. Although I was away on holiday, I did get mine in, though it wasn’t quite as detailed as planned. I have posted the full submission below but, in light of news out overnight, I wanted to add a few points.

My opposition to the proposal to partially sell 4 of our energy companies (and who knows what else down the line) is based not on an ideological opposition to privatisation (government should only own assets that have a public good purpose or have key national strategic value) but on the issues of finance, risk and law.

The finance argument is simple. There really is no case for selling these assets based on their poor performance, funding costs or return. Government debt may be high and set to rise but flogging the family silver provides short term gain with long term pain. The debt position in NZ (both public and private) is a structural problems and will not be solved by a $5-7b sell down of core assets.

The question of the risk of these proposed sales is perhaps more subtle. It simply comes down to how one views the provision of energy on a national scale. It is a clear public good, even if it can be provided privately (e.g solar or micro-wind) and therefore should be provided at least cost (taking into account externalities) to the public. Floating energy providers onto the stock market changes the goal of the company especially oil traders. Because oil prices on the stock market keep arising due to the great demand for oil. Considering that oil trading leads to a lucrative income, many traders and investors started oil trading via the oil profit app. Oil Profit is an automated trading platform that enables you to trade oil securely. On the oil profit opinion blog, you can also view people's opinions about the oil profit app. It is now a profit maximizer with long term shareholder value as its primary concern. Some might argue that SOEs are already operating in that model but that’s not relevant to this argument. The key is that in order to provide a public good, ownership must be in public hands. Added to that, the changes in technology and energy availability will require national level changes, planning and investment. Diluting ownership will make this problematic. At some point, the national interest may come back into focus and then what? What of the shareholders? They may not be interested in the national interest, especially if it impacts on the share price or their dividends.

This leads nicely into last night’s news. Argentina has sensationally nationalised YPF, a unit of the Spanish energy giant, Repsol, quoting “Hydrocarbon Sovereignty” (in Spanish) and basically arguing a lack of investment by YPF in Argentina. This is out and out expropriation and Repsol has hit back with a claim for $10.5b as compensation. This has been completely rejected by Argentina, as expected. This is likely to play out very badly in the international trade and investment arena and will probably end up in the international courts, if it is not resolved diplomatically.

Now this is exactly what I alluded to in my submission around the issue of international law and any future re-nationalisation or expropriation of assets, no matter what the situation is locally. Added to that we have the TPPA lurking in the background, which may further complicate matters, especially for a National government desperate to turn everything in NZ into an investment. One may argue that there is absolutely nothing to worry about in terms of possible future legal claims or problems but history shows us that this is a serious and unconsidered risk. Certainly I have not seen it in mentioned in any commentary. The government tries to duck and weave around the wording and structure of the sales model but it really needs to rethink the whole process from start to finish.

 

Submission on the Mixed Ownership Model Bill

The main purpose of the bill is to raise funds to reduce government debt and provide funds for new spending on public services. Reducing government debt is a laudable proposition and one can do that by increasing taxes, cutting expenditure or selling assets.

 

The government has chosen to sell publicly owned assets, specifically energy companies, in order to raise somewhere between $5 and $7b. These numbers are purely guesswork and will depend on a number of factors, including current market conditions, offering price and the structure of the companies post-sale.

 

This proposed bill is of concern for a number of reasons, which are listed below. I have categorized them into three areas: finance, risk and legal.

 

1)   Finance: The prime reason given for selling energy companies is that they provide a poor return to the government and that private owners may extract more “efficiencies” from the businesses. There has been no clear-cut evidence provided to support the former assertion, namely that the return from the energy companies is lower than the cost of government debt. Furthermore, there is scant evidence to support the proposition that privately run energy companies are any more efficient than publicly run ones. As we have seen from the Pike River disaster, private companies tend to be poor managers of risk and cut costs wherever possible, in order to increase profits. As many costs are externalized as possible to achieve this goal. In the energy business, this is a very dangerous approach. It seems that the financial argument is weak at best.

2)   Risk: As alluded to above, risk management is of serious concern when privatizing companies in the energy space. Energy provision is a prime public good and should therefore be provided by the public. Like water, energy is a pre-requisite for basic survival and should, therefore, not be seen as a profit maximizing good. By giving up pubic ownership of these basic assets, we open ourselves up to a poorer service, which may be based on ability to pay rather than a right to have the basic provision of energy. We may also lose the ability to make changes to and investment in the development of new energy production and networks. Investors, even with a 10% cap and other restrictions, will still have rights and views (see legal for further argument on this point), which may not be aligned with the public good. As well as safety and control risks, there is the risk of prices being raised over and above what might be appropriate. The example of the Bolivian water privatization and the Bechtel corporation (see Cochabamba riots of 2000) is a good example of what can go wrong when private interests are allowed to control basic pubic goods. Theses risks should not be taken lightly.

3)   Legal: Global investment rules have been expanded significantly over the last 20 years. NAFTA, the WTO and numerous bilateral trade agreements, have made the investment law field extremely complicated. What is clear, though, is that foreign investors have clear rights and these rights may, in some cases, trump domestic law and the expectations of the domestic citizenry. Examples of this are the Santa Elena case in Costa Rica, the Metalclad Corporation vs. The United Mexican States and the Ethyl Corporation vs. Canada. These are a small example of cases taken by foreign investors against states, where they feel their rights have been infringed. This could be for a number of reasons: environmental laws, human rights laws or expropriation (e.g. arising from renationalization or similar action).  We have transnational agreements being negotiated in secrecy (the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)), which may contain further restrictions on the ability to make decisions based on domestic considerations but perceived as harmful to foreign investors. The making of new international investment rules has seen many unintended consequences. The same outcomes may apply to this bill.

 

In summary, it is clear that the proposed bill has some serious problems. There are many consequences, known and unknown, which give cause for deep reflection and concern. The financial argument is weak and there are other ways to raise funds for public expenditure. Of more concern is the risk and legal framework that may end up being applied. The examples are too numerous to fully list but they are clear and unambiguous as to the impact on the local population and its finances.

 

This bill seems predicated on an ideological desire to privatize state assets and not on any serious and well thought out argument for doing so. I would therefore argue strongly against its implementation.

 

 

Raf Manji,

Director,

Sustento Institute,

Christchurch.

 

Since the National party moved into the Beehive back in 2008, mining has been a contentious issue. The government, looking for ways to mirror Australia, as well as speed up economic growth, focused on upscaling the mining industry. We have plenty of coal in country and, possibly, major reserves of oil and gas offshore. What’s not to like about that?

Well quite a lot really. Gulf of Mexico ring any bells? Like Chernobyl and Bhopal before, major industrial accidents can have long-term, catastrophic consequences, as well as immediate costs measured in human and economic cost. Offshore drilling carries huge risk and major negative downstream effects if it goes wrong. Onshore mining, on the other hand, is supposed to be plain vanilla these days. Apparently it’s a little like rolling up a cricket wicket and re-laying it when you’ve dug out a bit of sub-soil.

It’s safe, clean and you end up with an environment, which is as good as, if not better, than before. I was told that by the Assistant Head of Global HSE at Rio Tinto back in 2000. Actually it made sense to me…if you contain all the possible polluting effects, run a safe operation and remediate to very high standards…that could work. Perhaps that culture hasn’t quite made to to NZ. Judging by the poor practices at Pike River, one would have to ask serious questions about the management of mining in NZ. This has been reinforced by the recent shutdown of the Solid Energy mine at Spring Creek.

So I’m waiting to be convinced about this new world of clean coal and safe extractive practices. However, whilst I’m waiting, I’d like to suggest another way forward. Given that we do need certain commodities to be extracted, we need to create a risk structure that allows for exploration but with a precautionary approach. In other words, extractors must pay their way and do so in a manner that reflects the worst case scenario, such as the BP Gulf of Mexico disaster. So far BP have set aside a $20b fund for settling claims, of which $7.8b has been currently allocated. It’s an extreme event but an example of how badly things can go wrong when operating in sub-optimal conditions.

It’s time to explore environmental contingency bonds, as a way of mitigating risk and ensuring that insurance is in place before the extracting activity takes place. Just as someone renting a house has to pay a bond up front, to ensure any potential damage is covered, so do extractors have to pay an upfront amount before they start work. This upfront risk adjusted payment would be used to purchase government bonds (supposedly risk free!) or similar risk free asset, for the duration of the extractive activity. If, at the end of the activity period, there are no adverse effects, over and above what may have already been applied for, then the money is returned (plus any interest) to the extractor.

There are several consequences to this approach:

- This may increase the cost of extraction (though, in reality, this is simply a financing cost, assuming no damage occurs).

- This may spur companies towards better risk management and remediation processes. If they get it wrong, they pay. The onus of responsibility falls on the extractor and not the taxpayer and/or local community.

- In some cases, the sum demanded by the rental agent (usually the government) will be too high for the extractor to bear and this may result in the proposed project not proceeding. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, as the priced risk is considered to be too high. An example of this may be drilling for oil in the Arctic or the new trade of the day, fracking.

How will the bond be priced? Each industry will have a different risk factor, which will be based on previous data….for example, offshore oil drilling and onshore coal mining have very different risk profiles. It’s important to note that this is not an insurance payment but a full cash upfront payment. The extractor may, of course, wish to insure their own risk on having to forfeit the bond but the important point here is that the government holds the cash and can move into remediation action as soon as any damage occurs. As we have seen with numerous disasters, insurers and re-insurers are difficult to deal with and can lock up claims for many years.

Remediating and risk management plans are great but for business, paying cash up front against possible mishaps will certainly concentrate their focus on doing the job properly and without harm. The public will be happier knowing that extractors are having to pay upfront and that they will, therefore, do their utmost to ensure their activities are not polluting, harmful or dangerous. Governments will be happy knowing that they have the cash in the bank, just in case anything does happen. The extractors? Well they probably won’t be happy at the extra cost but according to them they will leave the place in a better condition than they found it. So really they have nothing to worry about at all.

 

 

 

 

 

 

“To be, or not to be, that is the question,

Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer

The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,

Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,

And by opposing end them.”  Hamlet, Act III, Scene 1.

It seems, after nearly 30 years of deregulated markets, that we face a sea of troubles ourselves. An extreme global debt deleveraging is upon us, the numbers too outrageous to even consider. Not only have we consumed beyond our means, we have mortgaged our future. Whereas once credit was difficult to come by and banks conservative in their lending (can you pay this back?), the brave new world brought us access to unlimited treasures, all paid for on a credit system, which had limited restraint.

As financial models became more complex and debt could be packaged, securitised and sold off, all sense of restraint was lost. Who owed whom was lost in a parallel universe of metaphor: swap, hedge, collateral, obligation, repurchase. Repaying principal and interest, in the old fashioned sense was put to one side. Can you afford the interest? Don’t worry about the principal, that will pay itself off as the price rises! Can’t afford the interest? Don’t worry, we’ll lend that to you as well, or have a holiday (from interest that is….keeps charging but pay it some other time). Tick, tock, tick, tock.

Maybe Hamlet wasn’t as crazy as he sounded.

As I explained in a previous post on the Euro, deleveraging debt is a painful process. As debts are written off, the money supply contracts, causing a contraction in the general economy. This creates a spiral where demand for new credit drops and this causes further losses to business, resulting in more job losses and so on. Traditionally, this has been dealt with by the lowering of interest rates, which hopefully stimulate demand for credit and reduce interest burdens. Sadly, this doesn’t work until the overhanging debt has been cleared out, by which time unemployment has risen and economic output has contracted to severe levels.

The road to austerity is a self-fulfilling process. Clearing the debt mountain will take many years and, perhaps, like Japan, it could be a decade or more. During that time people will be unemployed, machines will sit idle and resources will be untouched. In the 1930s governments stood back, waiting for the miracle of the market. None came. That is not a road we want to travel down.

As the shadow banking system starts to fall apart, it is time to plan and look forward to building a stable and local supply of money to see us through the hard times. Continuing to rely on overseas capital and ever increasing borrowing is a road to ruin. Our gross debt will hit $90 billion  by 2016, according to Treasury forecasts. The government talks of returning to surplus by 2015 but that is very optimistic. Even then we will still carry this debt for many years to come.

So is printing new money and spending it directly into the economy a better idea? I talked about this in a recent interview with Kim Hill and Radio NZ National, which you can catch here.

RadioNZ National Kim Hill interview

I have had an incredible amount of positive feedback since the interview and, interestingly, from a very wide range of people. There were a few comments about “funny money”, including a little pop from Nevil Gibson at the NBR. My answer to that is if you think this is funny money, try explaining the nearly $4 trillion that’s been used to buy debt off US banks! The feedback has confirmed the following: that there needs to be a clearer explanation on how the money creation process actually works (even though the RB has published on this here), that inflation needs to be better understood and that people are extremely concerned about the way the financial system is structured. We will be working on producing a simpler explanation to those issues.

In the meantime, around the world, there is a lot of new work being undertaken around the quantitative easing process and how that is not really working. Sushil Wadhwani (Goldman Sachs and MPC member in the UK) and economist (and former colleague of mine) Michael Dicks have looked at more direct interventions into the economy, noting that QE is a very roundabout way of trying to stimulate an economy. They look at directing lending to companies from the central bank and, more interestingly, at simply giving households a voucher to spend. You can read the brief paper here. Their proposals are in the right direction but do not go far enough. Nouriel Roubini recently wrote that direct spending on new infrastructure in the US would be much more useful than simply buying toxic bonds off failing banks.

What’s clear is that more and more economists and policy analysts are realising that QE is a sop to the banks, boosting their balance sheets and stock prices, at the expense of the taxpayer. Clearly this is a misallocation (and perhaps misappropriation) of taxpayer funds. Furthermore, even with trillions of $ of QE, there has been no inflationary effects at all. This is important to note when considering the direct injection of new money, as we have proposed, for the Christchurch rebuild.

As I noted in this recent piece for ChangeNZ, as long as there is surplus labour and resources, there will be no inflationary effects from new money. This has been confirmed from business sources, who note the economy is limping along at between 33-50% of capacity. So there is little concern over the direct effects of the new money in raising prices. The indirect effects through the banking system are also likely to be minimal, given a very low demand for credit across the economy. Indeed, with debt deleveraging in full swing, we are likely to see further reductions in debt, offsetting any new potential demand for credit. Still, credit numbers will need to be watched carefully and, at the same time, it’s important to note that the amount we are suggesting is only $5 billion. Ultimately the goal is a strong and locally managed financial system with price stability. That is something we have not had, despite the continuing myth of a central bank induced low inflationary environment. The time is right to consider an alternative way forward.

Perhaps we should leave the final words to Hamlet, as we ponder the road ahead:

“The undiscovered country, from whose bourn

No traveller returns, puzzles the will,

And makes us rather bear those ills we have,

Than fly to others that we know not of?

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,

And thus the native hue of resolution

Is sicklied o’er, with the pale cast of thought,

And enterprises of great pitch and moment

With this regard their currents turn awry,

And lose the name of action..…”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is a post from about 5 weeks ago, before the Occupy Wall Street protest started. It was lost on a server transfer so I’m reloading it now. It makes interesting reading when thinking about the Occupy movement and what its core concerns are. I think the post below encapsulates those concerns, namely: measurement, institutions and values. Our current system externalises as many costs as possible, has institutions cuorrupted by money, and has lost any sense of meaningful values, other than monetary gain. Not only has our economy become monetised, so has our society. In terms of how values have been set aside and how they may be recovered, this piece by Chris Hedges is revealing. On to the original post.

Economics is quite popular these days. It’s not so much the traditional discipline, itself, that is the focus, but a constant flagellation of its representation. Simply put, it’s not delivering the goods. Many trained economists would argue that economics is not the problem but the solution. To paraphrase “it’s the politicians, stupid!”.

The word “economics” also seem to be creeping into the title of every other book, blog or column. “The Economics of…….sex, drugs, football, hairdressing (i made that one up) and so on. The message is clear. People want to know how the world works and seek to understand it through the lens of economics, which is, as I’m repeatedly informed, only about the allocation of resources. We’ve also had Freakonomics followed up by SuperFreakonomics, just in case you didn’t get it the first time.

Diane Coyle is a serial offender is this area with 2 recent books called “Sex, Drugs and Economics” and “The Economics of Enough” (I would recommend both and happy to lend them to anyone local). These books do help us to make more sense of the way our economy works and, therefore, how our society is structured. Economics describes how people transact with each other and for what reasons. Getting into the nitty gritty of personal life seems an odd place for economics to be but research continues to show that how we make decisions is very much dependent on variables which can, to some extent, be measured and quantified. Put bluntly, incentives and pay offs do matter (unless you have no impulse control at all – read male teenagers – but this can be controlled and measured as well).

“The Economics of Enough” is a well written account of  the economic challenges facing us and how we can move forward to create more even prosperity and happiness. Diane outlines what is importance to people: happiness, nature, posterity, fairness and trust. She then looks at where the problems are: our measurement system, our values and our institutions. She then finishes off with a “Manifesto of Enough”, a ten point programme for shifting to a world of “Enough”. It’s all very useful and accurate in its conception. What I like about the book is the realisation that our values have become warped (seen readily in the fiasco of the Global Financial Crisis and its response) and our institutions have become corrupted by those same values. Changing that will require some serious reform and will face major resistance by the vested interests happy with the current situation.

Slipping nicely alongside this book is a new film called “The Economics of Happiness“, which I screened last night in Christchurch to an audience of 115 people, including 2 local MPs. This film, by Helena Norberg-Hodge, Steven Gorelick and John Page, visits themes raised by Diane in her book, but it does so in a more poetic fashion. Drawing on many years research and living in Ladakh, Helena pulls together a picture of a severely fractured global population struggling to maintain its humanity in the face of the onslaught of globalisation. The film dismantles many myths around the benefits of globalisation, describing it is ultimately a process designed for major transnational corporations to increase profits at the expense of people and planet. It’s naturally tends towards the polemical but it’s hard to dispute the evidence. Median incomes do not tell us the whole story. The constant externalisation of environmental and social costs produce a massive hidden subsidy to the global business network. The global institutions (IMF, WTO and World Bank) support and embed this process and remove sovereignty wherever possible so that business faces no impediment. We don’t pay the true costs but some one else picks up the tab.

This links back to Diane’s discussion around measurement. Economics can only be of use if the variables, that are plugged into the models, have integrity. As both Diane and Helena note, the value of integrity is missing. The pressure of profit takes few prisoners and if a cost can be ignored, it will be. Whilst Diane is still in favour of economic growth, she recognises it must come within a properly constructed framework. Helena goes further in promoting a more localized world, where we are in touch with, and close to, our processes and means of production. This approach brings the connection back into our lives and this, ultimately, is the root of the happiness we are looking for.

The clear message from these works (and others like it) is clear. There is a desire for a new approach to our economy and there is evidence to support it. The various manifestos, blueprints and proposals for reform are starting to merge in content and structure. Slowly but surely a solid platform for re-envisaging our society is coming together and a renaissance in economics may not be far away.

I was asked recently to give a talk to a small but distinguished group on “how to survive the global financial and ecological crises”. Easy uh! Well you have to start somewhere and have a rough idea of where you’re headed. For me, the more difficult the situation gets, the simpler the solution becomes. Essentially, changes that once would have been rejected flat out as unworkable, implausible and idealistic, are suddenly deemed more acceptable.

We are all conditioned to think and live within a certain paradigm or system. For many of us (especially readers of this blog), it’s considered to be democratic, liberal capitalism. More realistically it’s a neo-liberal system where free markets dominate at the expense of any concept of the public good. Markets will solve any problem. Actually that’s a truism. It’s the outcome that is often of dubious merit.

When I look at the Occupy Movement, I see a protest against this system, a system where people are secondary to profit, and the public is considered to be a wasteful and unnecessary construct. As John Key noted of the Christchurch post-EQNZ insurance problem, eventually the markets will sort it out. Again they will but there may not be any insurance for anyone for a while. This mirrors the government’s approach to managing our prisons: simply contract it out to private operators, who will manage it more “efficiently”. The belief in the idea of the “public” is slowly being eaten away by this neo-liberal fantasy that for profit organisations will always achieve the best outcome.

It will be interesting to see how this protest develops but it feels like it has legs. The outrage is fair and justified: the corruption at the heart of the political-financial system; the gaping inequalities; the disenfranchisement and the feeling that the whole system is built on sand. Over time the picture will be clearer and the protests may coalesce around a series of concrete demand but the consultative and participatory process is a fascinating starting point. Participatory, as opposed to representative, democracy is messy, frustrating, turgid, slow, tedious and annoying but that’s the whole point. It is built on allowing all people a voice and on allowing a process to develop. It is a far cry from the many bills rammed through under “urgency” in the NZ Parliament, with little debate or scrutiny for even our partially elected representatives.

I wish them well in their endeavour. In the meantime, I have three simple proposals to offer, as a starting point:

1) Monetary Dialysis - No more public debt; new public money; raise limits on bank credit.

2) Trucost pricing - Start pricing ecosystem goods and services.

3) Participatory Universal Income - Basic Income for all those participating in society; rebalanced tax system; provision of key public goods.

I focused on the first 2 ideas in my presentation, the outline of which is below. By repricing our economic system, both in the cost of goods and services, as well as the creation and volume of money, we will immediately realign it towards a path of lower volume but higher quality consumption. We will reduce the burden of compound interest, this alleviating the constant pressure to produce and consume. The UPI will restore the public good in reflecting all contributions to society and laying the foundations for a more stable, harmonious and prosperous world. Far fetched? Not really, when you think about it for a bit. My turn is over for now. Who is next in the stack?

The pressure is really on now for the Euro leaders (Germany and France) to come up with a permanent solution for the fiscal disaster that is the Eurozone. They have few options open to them and none of them are palatable to many. However, with the enormous burden of sovereign debt hanging over the Euro, they must make a move sooner rather than later or risk a complete blow up in the Eurozone debt markets which will lead to severe contagion a la 2008 meltdown in credit markets.

So what are the options?

1) One solution, which further develops the Euro project, is for full fiscal integration. This would be a major step and involve the Euro authorities taking over the management of individual countries fiscal responsibilities, outstanding debts and all future decision making over taxation and borrowing. It’s an ultimately surrender of financial sovereignty for all countries in the Eurozone. As with EU membership, this would favour the economically weaker countries as their borrowing rates would fall. Sadly for some, like Germany, their borrowing rates would rise, as there would be one single Eurobond, financed at an average rate of all the countries combined. It would most certainly be lower than the average rates now but still above where the most creditworthy (if there is such a thing) pay. The chances of this happening are slim to none, even though Merkel and Sarkozy have discussed moves in this direction. Behind this idea sits the possibility of a fully fledged Eurozone Government, the fear of many Euro-sceptics over the years. The reality is that this proposal can only work if there is a USE - United States of Europe.

It’s very hard to see this getting past voters in any country unless there is a financial meltdown of apocalyptic scale at which point “emergency measures may be justified” to coin a favorite term of “shock doctrine” watchers. For an amusing fictional account of how things may turn out, read this gem of a story “Berlin gets ready to leave the Euro”. Merkel’s electoral setback is hardly likely to shift matters forward.

2) The middle ground is for some of the weaker countries to leave the Euro and re-create their old currencies. These would be set initially at a rate which would enable some form of devaluation to help their export markets recover. This would entail quite a tricky transition process, both legal and financial, and the sheer mess it would cause logistically is enough to put many off, notwithstanding the theoretical attractiveness of a clean cut. The debt picture would be less fun: it’s hard to imagine anything less than a complete default if there was no further support from the EFSF . ANy debt denominated in local currency would face exorbitant rates meaning, in reality, those countries would not be able to borrow money. In effect, any country leaving the euro would result in default and an inability to raise money. The outcome of this would be complete financial chaos……initially. However, as with Iceland, it could lead to a complete restructuring of their economy at a completely new level.

In some ways this situation parallels that of some clients I have as a budget advisor. Some come with simple problems: a need to budget better, clear debt, sort out messy financial positions. However, some come with debts that are not possible to restructure in any way. They simply have no chance of ever repaying them, barring a lottery win. In these situations, they have been allowed to take on more debt than they can possibly service and often they have depreciating assets against an outstanding debt (a car for example). They are usually finished off by the compounding interest. It’s clear in these cases that lenders have been very, very sloppy. Often, as with professional investors, the search for yield or the desire to sell a loan overrides a proper analysis of the risk profile. This is how people end up with a debt mountain.

Insolvency is, sadly, the only answer. Life after insolvency is a, in current market parlance, an austere one. But it’s not the end of the world….life goes on. However, for the lender, it is a total loss…..though in many cases the debt has been packaged up and sold off, down the debt collection food chain.

Sovereign debt is no exception. Sure some countries can sell as much as they like (the US and Japan for example) but for others, with less collateral (whether in the form of private savings, trade surpluses or simply a reserve currency), there is a limit. Those limits have been breached and there is simply no way out. As I say to some clients: spend less, earn more or default.

This leads us nicely to:

3) Muddling along and trying to keep things as they are. This has been the course charted for the last few years: bank bailouts, sovereign bailouts and major cuts in public spending. This is akin to bailing out a sinking ship with water removed from one area whilst it pours in from another. As with option 1) there has been a reluctance to take action that would create some long term obligations for the major Eurozone underwriters (mainly Germany but also France to some extent). So funds have been created for special purposes to buy the sovereign debt of stressed countries. This has worked in part but again the markets can do the sums and see that they don’t add up.

At fault here, as usual, are the lenders. They have been happy to buy up sovereign debt on the basis that it’s too big to fail (TBTF) and that rates were attractive given the implicit support from the Eurozone. Why buy German Bunds when you can buy Greek paper at a much better yield? The market is supposed to be the restraint on government borrowing, knowing when to demand higher yields and when to say no more. But the post-EMU convergence desire for yield at any cost remains core to the investment approach of many. EMU was a big fudge to start with: how on earth did Greece, Italy and the other laggards suddenly reduce their budget deficits to 3%? It was all too tidy because it was always a political rather than economic project.

So governments spent too much and were able to borrow freely to support this. Investors were unconcerned knowing ultimately, it’s all underwritten by someone. The numbers now are too big and if underwriting as in option 1) is not the chosen path then the muddling along will have to involve some serious haircuts (read: partial defaults) in order for the system to continue to function. And why not? Investors have made poor decisions and have to pay the price. So why the reluctance to proceed down this route?

Well here’s where we get to the crux of the matter. European banks, and others, have invested heavily in sovereign bonds. If we see partial defaults or major restructuring then banks will be in trouble again and we will be back to 2008 in a flash. The reality is though that banks should have been allowed to fail back then with investors taking their losses as would be expected in a market system. Bailing out the banks in Europe and the US, whilst making no real reforms, has simply multiplied the problem and led us to where we are now.

At some point, the loss has to be taken by the investors and not the public.

It’s clear that none of the 3 options are palatable. But as I say to my budget clients, that’s the whole point. They never are. Debt is a miserable beast at best and when it climbs all over you there is no easy way out.

The Euro was always a pet project of Germany and France, a chance to unite Europe and create a powerhouse to rival the US and the ASEAN block. It was a project birthed from centuries of conflict and huge loss of life. Europe’s leaders stand at a crossroads. No path is easy to take: to go forward would see the European Project move towards its eventual conclusion, a true European Union. To go sideways means and end to the dream and a system in tatters.

The former is most unpopular, the latter a financial disaster. There really is no room for soft solutions here. It could be the end of the dream or the start of  a new future. Either way there are hard times ahead.