Time for a book review.

I’ve just finished Michael Lewis’s “The Big Short”. It’s an amazing book, not just because it informs us of the road to the subprime mess but he creates a story around the protagonists. He also manages to expose the whole wretched mess, the fictionalisation of risk and yield laid bare. He introduces us to the main players in the debacle through the eyes of a few weird and wonderful players who worked out that something was terribly wrong and bet against it. These colourful characters expose the whole damn scheme as nothing more than a paper pyramid.

As Lewis sums up the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) on page 73:

“The CDO was, in effect, a credit laundering service for the residents of Lower Middle Class America. For Wall Street it was a machine that turned lead into gold”.

Simply put a CDO was a collection (a tower) of subprime loans that had miraculously transformed from junk status to triple A (AAA) credit and therefore it was investible by major funds (referred to in the book as dopey Germans).

So what was the short? Well on one hand you had investors who sold insurance on these debts defaulting. They believed (incorrectly) that it could never happen and therefore they were picking up free money. The shorters realised the were getting amazing odds on the loans defaulting and piled in.

At the bottom of this was an average person with no money and a big mortgage, usually 100% or more. Any fall in the price of their property would immediately put them in a default position. Yes it was a giant pyramid scheme. The real laugh is that even the guys going short didn’t really understand what it was they were shorting so opaque was the structure and process.

I recommend the book very highly. It’s a gripping read and manageable for the layperson.

You’re left wondering how the bankers got away with it. The answer given by the bankers (well laid out in Sorkin’s book) was that they were too big to fail.

This sets us up nicely for the next round.

P.S.

Today the SEC is launching a case against ICP Asset management for their role in handling CDO investments. Along with the case against Goldman Sachs we can expect more companies to be investigated for their role in this financial fraud. It will also be interesting to see when the rating agencies themselves will come under review. They were the ones who gave the AAA blessing to these products they really knew very little about. Makes you wonder about the whole darn shooting match!

One of the greatest financial inventions is leverage: the ability to create an asset of value in excess of your original investment.

Simply put this is how you can buy a house with no deposit or a small one. Consider the reality of leverage:

You buy a house for $500,000 and put down a 10% deposit of $50,000.

In a few years (certainly recent times) you sell it for $600,000. You have just made $100,000 from an investment of $50,000…a 200% return. Of course you have to subtract your interest but that is what you would have paid in rent anyway or so the theory goes.

In recent years this has been the name of the game. Between 2000 and 2008 New Zealand house prices rose 169%……..!! Yes that’s an incredible number………21% per annum on average. No wonder people thought this was an easy game. No wonder leveraged investments in property became the biggest game in town. But hold on: we are talking about houses not tulips. How could such an unusual bout of asset inflation happen right under the noses of the inflation focused RBNZ.

Well house prices are not included in the CPI calculation. Call me old fashioned but that’s ridiculous.

The major problem with any bubble is that it ends. In this case NZ has not had the same end as the USA with its sub-prime mortgage induced property collapse though the NZ finance company sector did its best to compete.

But the leverage has not been washed out of the system yet. House prices have recovered from the 2008-9 fall and now are back up close to their historic highs. Why is this? Why hasn’t the NZ housing market fallen back to more realistic levels?

There’s no clear answer but I’d like to suggest one: It’s not in the interest of the banks for prices to fall heavily. Why? Because they are the ultimate owners of the housing stock. If they lend 90% to a borrower and the price of that house falls 10% then the borrower has lost their equity and the bank owns the rest. That’s how leverage works on the downside. If the price falls further than 10% the borrower is into negative equity. So far so normal. The bank will just hoover up any savings or other assets held by the borrower. But at some point the bank is left holding the security. Banks don’t like that very much so they seek to sell the asset and recover as much cash as possible. If the borrower cannot cover the loss then the bank has to write that off.

But in a bubble situation the banks have to be very careful not to knock down the price of all property. Otherwise their entire lending portfolio will take a hit not just the one loan which went bad. So banks have a vested interest in keeping prices from falling too far.

Back in 2008 I called for land prices to fall 30%. They haven’t yet but it’s simply a matter of time. In fact they only fell 8.5%…not much of a fall considering the enormity of the rise. Wages are not rising at a rate which can cover the compounding interest on the debt pile (see upcoming post on debt) so the strains of maintaining the illusion will continue to show through. Therefore the banks have a big part to play in making sure house prices do not rise or fall too much whilst they reorganise their lending practices.

What needs to happen? Well a reversion to traditional lending practices will come back into vogue: where you can borrow 2-3 times your salary. Imagine that. Median wage in Christchurch is somewhere between $30-40,000 depending where you look and the average house price is $360,000. Scary……so the banks who are operating on the interest/cash flow model (see upcoming post on definancialisation) will find switching back to the traditional model simply isn’t possible as house prices would fall by rather a lot. You couldn’t find a house for under $200,000 these days so we would have to see a severe correction, probably in excess of 30% though very low borrowing costs would help ease that.

It’s clear that the same financial practices that we have seen employed in the global bond markets have also been applied to residential lending. The valuation model shifted from the established practice of ability to repay the mortgage to the ability to cover the interest. Why? Because the price of the house would always go up. Really? Isn’t delusion fun. The fact is that prices did go up….and up…and up. As they say the market can be wrong a lot longer than you can be right.

All this creates a major dilemma for banks (who are probably aware, one hopes, of their position) and regulators who clearly are not (always happy to be surprised): How to withdraw leverage (which was a ponzi scheme) from the residential mortgage market without causing a crash? How to realise that we have been deluding ourselves as to the  ”value” of our houses. How can we explain that 169% rise? Did we suddenly become more wealthy? Er no our trade balance for the period March 2000-2008 was minus $30.7bln!!!!

No we simply revalued our property again and again for no reason other than the banks were happy to go with the valuations (also pushed it has to be said by overseas immigrants paying cash prices) which just kept going up. If house A in one street sold for 20% more then all the other houses must be worth 20% more. Housing became a commodity and so was able to enjoy the commodity style price action……….of course housing isn’t a commodity as people actually live in them. And that is what is keeping the market afloat…..but don’t look too hard at the numbers. They might make you wonder exactly what it all means.

More on that in the upcoming posts on debt and definancialisation.

It’s taken me a long time to get round to this post. My eyes have been glued to the train wreck that is European fiscal management. Who could forget the financial gymnastics performed by many EU wanna-bees prior to EMU integration. 3% budget deficit….no problem said Greece….we have some very good accountants in Athens.

So the chickens have finally come home. And now the Euro project is in harms way. Or is this just the next stage in complete sovereign consilience? It’s fiscal consolidation or that’s the end of the road.

The real problem, if you look hard enough under the falling limbs of the EU forest, is simply debt and its modern bedfellow, leverage. The financial binge of the last decade, built upon market deregulation in the 80s, has simply finished. Apres le binge, le deluge as they might say in Paris. A bad hangover is one thing but watching bankers get on the big white telephone is no fun at all.

The debt binge primarily was brought about not so much by low interest rates (though that helped) but by the belief that capital gain was guaranteed. Stocks always go up in the long run, property always goes up in the long run…..don’t worry about income, just borrow as much as you can and buy an asset. These financial assets have become a magnet for all investors and, naturally, sellers of investment products. I wonder how many people are holding derivative products which allow them to catch the upside of the stock market with no risk unless the market falls 50%….oops. Certainly Mr Buffet has a few of those.

The return to a time when people invested in companies based on their fundamental performance and bought houses to live in is long overdue. That people cannot afford to buy a home is without doubt the result of excessive lending by banks over the last 30 years. This is the root cause of the problem. Banks have actually created the inflation we have seen in financial assets….unearned income to be exact. That asset price inflation has seen real wages fall heavily over the years consigning the average wage earner or those unable to access leveraged credit to a lifetime of renting and debt.

The maths of excessive leverage is the simple maths of compound interest….compounded.

As Paul Volcker noted in this recent piece,

“There was one great growth industry. Private debt relative to GDP nearly tripled in thirty years. Credit default swaps, invented little more than a decade ago, soared at their peak to a $60 trillion market, exceeding by a large multiple the amount of the underlying credits potentially hedged against default.”

The bottom line is very simple: we have spent our GDP already….for many years hence.

Now it’s payback time. The payback process could take many forms: bankruptcy, forced asset sales or a slow descent back to a normalized level of activity – actually living within our means. Stripping away the financial sector so it works for people and business rather than conspiring against them will be the first requirement: not so much regulation as reengineering.

Whichever route we take it will be a painful adjustment made worse by the fact that those who are in charge are actually responsible for perpetuating the current system or refusing to question and change it.

Pretty bubbles in the air.

They fly so high,

Nearly reach the sky,

Then like my dreams,

They fade and die.

Fortune’s always hiding,

I’ve looked everywhere,

I’m forever blowing bubbles,

Pretty bubbles in the air.

Never did I believe the mighty Hammers would have understood the machinations of central banking so well. Maybe they knew?

Reading the recent Fed statement, one may feel that the lessons of the recent crisis have not been fully understood or learnt. That’s the problem with the ability to print new money to replace old. It gives a feeling of relief and so help the markets to recover, in fact recover strongly. But there is nothing here that suggests the policymakers know what they are doing.

Crisis dealt with? For now.

Following on from the news about Kiva moving into the US small business market, fleet footed Ben Kepes calls us to action in New Zealand.

Small businesses in NZ have seen no relief from high interest rates in the recent lowering of rates here. At the same time credit is hard to come by and many business owners have resorted to credit cards to keep their businesses going.

This is a troublesome state of affairs given its the productive economy that has to earn the dollars to pay back the humungous debt necklace hanging around the necks of Kiwis.

So what’s the state of play with microfinance at the moment? Well Kiva is going great guns. It’s really tapped into people’s desire to help and be generous in giving but created this new joy of creating and empowering change for people. It connects people together and that personal touch pulls the punters in.

The more tradtional p2p lending services are not finding life so easy. Charis Palmer reports here on recent developments citing problems for Prosper in the US and some success for Zopa in the UK. Locally Peermint has fallen by the wayside, Nexx hasn’t really got going and Lending Hub has joined a busy Australian market.

So there’s no shortage of platforms but it’s proving harder than expected to deliver the business. But there seems to be no platform for small businesses to secure funding. This is certainly an opportunity as there is certainly a strong and established market on the borrowing side with appropriate forms of due diligence available.

The major stumbling block for p2p start ups has been compliance with various regulatory authorities. However there may be ways around this and with politicians supportive of the small business sector the time may have come for a serious attempt to create what would be a mini-corporate bond market funded by the retail investement market direct.

Now that sounds like a major step forward in building a more productive economy.

Last month Tom Greco appeared as the keynote speaker at the national Community Currencies Conference in Wanganui. He is well known globally for his work on the topic of money. He described his attendance at the conference below

“The national Community Currencies Conference (April 17-19) brought together well over 100 enthusiastic participants who convened at the Quaker Settlement in Wanganui to share information and discuss new possibilities. My Keynote presentation delivered on Saturday morning (April 18) was titled, Reclaiming The Credit Commons: The Key to Sustainability and Relocalization. Prefaced with a brief outline of my vision of societal metamorphosis, I argued that liberating the exchange process from monopoly control by means of localization and popularization of credit is a necessary prerequisite to achieving a steady-state economy and the devolution of power to local communities”.

He also gave talks in Auckland entitled Money, Power, Democracy, and War: Finding the path toward global peace, harmony, and prosperity, on Waiheke Island entitled Community Economic Development: A Comprehensive and Innovative Approach and in Wellington entitledThe Political Money System: The Story of Central Banks, Inflation, and Legal Tender.

He was also interviewed by Kim Hill and that is available here

If anyone is interested in getting copies of those talks you can contact Tom through his website or blog.

I provided sponsorship for 3 people to attend the conference and they have written about their experience of the event in the following post.